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Institutional Requirements for Full Employment in Advanced Economies 
1
 
 
 
The problem of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments 
between countries has never been solved . . . the failure to 
solve this problem has been a major cause of impoverishment 
and social discontent and even of wars and revolutions . . . 
to suppose that there exists some smoothly functioning automatic 
mechanism of adjustment which preserves equilibrium if only 
we trust to matters of laissez faire is a doctrinaire delusion 
which disregards the lessons of historical experience without 
having behind it the support of sound theory. (J.M.Keynes)
2
 
 
I.  Introduction: The Analytical and the Policy Context 
 
In the 1980s, fifty years after the Great Depression industrial 
countries came again to be haunted with the spectre of mass 
unemployment.  The unemployment situation, into the 1990s, continues 
to be dire in several European Union countries. Double digit 
unemployment rates are currently being recorded by Belgium, Denmark, 
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 2 
France, Italy, with near double-digit rates in several others 
including Britain, Germany and Sweden. On the most recent available 
official data, nearly a quarter of the labour force in Spain and 
Finland are unemployed.
3
 As the recent OECD jobs study[OECD 1994] 
noted, the 35 million people presently unemployed in the member 
countries "represent an enormous waste of human resources, reflects 
an important amount of inefficiency in economic systems, and causes 
a disturbing degree of social distress". 
 
The OECD study estimates that unemployment in the form of involuntary 
part-time work, short-time working and the discouragement of job 
seekers from looking for new employment could add 40 to 50% to the 
unemployment figures outlined above. Apart from economic 
inefficiency, the study rightly notes that mass unemployment does 
enormous damage in other ways. "It brings with it unravelling of 
the social fabric, including a loss of authority of the democratic 
system and it risks resulting in the disintegration of the 
international trading system." It is important to stress this social 
dimension of unemployment since professional economists in their 
dispassionate and objective studies are prone to overlook it. Whether 
or not there is a link between joblessness and crime, there is evidence 
that unemployment leads to social degradation, is associated with 
health problems, lower self-esteem, is de-motivating and creates 
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 The source of these data which for most countries pertains to 
September or October 1994 is The Economist, 5 November, 1994. 
  
 
 3 
insecurity and resistance to organisational and technical change.
4
 
 
The current mass unemployment stands in striking contrast to the 
situation which prevailed in the industrial countries in the not 
too distant past. During the 1950s and the 1960s, leading industrial 
countries not only enjoyed full employment but had over-full 
employment. In addition to being able to employ all their own people, 
these countries also provided jobs for additional labour from abroad. 
In countries like France and West Germany nearly 10 per cent of the 
labour force came from other nations.  
 
The period 1950-1973 has been aptly described as the Golden Age of 
the world economy.  In the advanced economies during this period, 
there was a historically unprecedented expansion of production and 
consumption at a rate of nearly 5 per cent a year.  This was 
accompanied by a huge increase in world trade, particularly in the 
export of manufactured products,  The latter grew in volume terms 
at a very fast rate of nearly 10 per cent a year. Most developing 
countries also participated in and benefitted from this world wide 
prosperity. Many Asian and Latin American countries embarked on a 
veritable industrial revolution in these post-war decades.  
 
The Golden Age of simultaneous prosperity for the North and the South 
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 4 
evidently came to an end with the first oil shock in 1973. Since 
then, the rate of growth of the OECD and the world GDP has nearly 
halved. Significantly, the recorded rate during the last twenty years 
is much more in line with the long term trend rate of growth of 
industrial countries in the hundred years before the Golden Age. 
(Reynolds, 1983; World Bank, 1987).  It is therefore not surprising 
to find the high rates of unemployment recently experienced by the 
OECD -- rates which were unthinkable in the preceding period. It 
is for the same reason, that for a large number of countries in the 
South, in contrast to the industrial revolution, greater employment 
opportunities and significant rises in the average standard of living 
of the Golden Age, the last fifteen years have been marked by 
de-industrialisation, considerable falls in per capita incomes and 
much increased under and open unemployment
5
. The end of the Golden 
Age has also coincided with a significant deceleration in the 
expansion of world trade in manufactures. 
 
In view of its magnitude, durability, and  intractability so far, 
the unemployment problem today is at the top of the political agenda. 
                     
    
5
 There have been important intercontinental differences in the 
economic experience of developing countries in the 1980s and into 
the 1990s. During the last decade, whilst Asian countries continued 
with their previous momentum of rapid industrialisation and 
development, economic growth collapsed in Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1980 and 1990 per capita income fell on 
average by 10% in Latin America and by as much as 25% on average in 
the Sub-Saharan African countries. In contrast, the Asian countries 
recorded on average a more than 50% increase in their per capita 
incomes. See further Fishlow(1992), Singh (1993,1994). 
  
 
 5 
During the last two years it has drawn serious attention at G7 summits 
and at meetings of the European Council. There have been important 
official documents, for example the European Commissions White Paper 
of December 1993 and the OECD study of joblessness, referred to above. 
The subject has also led to a staggering amount of academic economic 
literature in the recent period. [For recent reviews, see Bean, 1994; 
Elmeskov, 1993]. However, this literature is very far from having 
produced either an analytical or a policy consensus. Nevertheless 
it will be fair to say that to the extent that there is any agreement 
among economists, it is on a negative point, with most of them 
believing that the restoration of sustained full employment in 
industrial countries in the foreseeable future is utopian and 
impractical. The weight of opinion seems to be that, unless entirely 
new instruments and policies are introduced,  unemployment can, at 
best, only be significantly reduced from its present high levels, 
but it cannot be eliminated in the way it essentially was during 
the Golden Age. 
 
This paper outlines what shape such new instruments and policies 
would need to take in order not just to reduce unemployment but to 
restore full employment. 
6
 It also departs from much of the 
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 The concept of what constitutes full employment is of course 
highly controversial, both analytically and empirically. Many 
economists would define full employment in terms of the 
"non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment" (NAIRU) or the 
"natural rate of unemployment". (See section VI for an analysis of 
these concepts). The present paper does not share these conceptions 
 and regards full employment and price stability as two related but 
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literature by adopting an explicitly historical and institutional 
approach to the analysis of mass unemployment. It focuses on the 
Golden Age of full employment in the North and the harmonious 
development of the North and the South, to ask the questions:  Why 
did the Golden Age of plentiful jobs and fast growth arise?  Why 
did it come to an end?  What lessons can we learn from it for the 
present?  The basic theses of the paper may be summarised as follows: 
 
*It is not possible to explain the Golden Age economic boom simply 
as a product of a chance combination of favourable 
circumstances.  
*Rather the Golden Age  was the outcome of a unique economic regime 
- a new development model - which was very different from that 
prevailing in the inter-war period, and also from the one which 
has been instituted in the last decade and a half. 
                                                                  
independent objectives (Meade 1993). Therefore, for the purposes of 
this exercise, full employment is taken to be synonomous with low 
or negligible levels of "involuntary" unemployment. In more practical 
terms, Beveridge's (1944) definition of full employment still has 
considerable merit. Beveridge defined full employment as a state of 
affairs where there are slightly more unfilled vacancies than the 
number unemployed, and "that the jobs are at fair wages, of such a 
kind, and so located that the unemployed men can be expected to take 
them". This definition implies that "unemployment at any time is due 
to the normal lag between a person losing a job and finding another". 
Eatwell (1994) proposes a useful amendment to the definition: he 
suggests that the "discouraged" workers should added to the number 
unemployed. On that basis, Eatwell estimates that in 1993 in UK there 
were over four millions inactive workers (2.8 million officially 
unemployed and the rest discouraged workers) as against the total 
number of vacancies of little over 100,000. See further Worswick 
(1987), Blinder (1988), Meade (1993), Eatwell (1993), Britton (1994), 
Singh and Zammit (1995). 
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*The Golden Age economic regime was not a spontaneous development, 
but reflected in part a carefully designed stragegy. It involved 
gigantic institutional innovations by leading industrial 
countries at both the national and at the international levels. 
 
*The demise of the Golden Age was due to events overtaking the existing 
institutional framework. For the Golden Age to have continued, 
the system required some of the extant institutions to adapt 
to the new situation. But it also needed the building of fresh 
institutions. 
 
*An analytical and historical examination of the Golden Age has 
important policy lessons for the task of restoring full 
employment in industrial countries today. The implied policy 
proposals are, however, rather different from those which follow 
from the conventional analyses of unemployment.  
 
II.  Current Unemployment in Historical Perspective: Empirical 
Phenomena to be Explained 
 
Tables 1 and 2 bring out some of the main features of unemployment, 
employment, output and productivity growth in industrial countries 
during the last three decades. The main points which emerge from 
these tables may be summarised as follows: 
  
 
 8 
 
1.  Unemployment  There has been a huge trend increase in 
unemployment in the post-Golden Age period in all leading industrial 
countries, including the United States. (Table 1). However, the rise 
has been much greater in Europe than in the US. The West German case 
is particularly striking, as average unemployment there during the 
last decade of the Golden Age was only 0.79% of the labour force; 
it rose eight-fold in the decade 83-92. These empirical phenomena 
raise for analysis the following questions. 
 
-Why has there been such a large trend increase in industrial country 
unemployment during the last 15 years, compared with the Golden 
Age? 
 
-Why unemployment has risen more in European Community countries 
than in the US? 
 
-Why has unemployment risen much less in non-EEC European countries 
than in EEC Europe? 
 
The last point is not evident from table 1, but emerges from the 
more detailed data provided by Bean(1994). These data show that not 
only US but also a number of Nordic countries did relatively well 
with respect to unemployment in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
  
 
 9 
2.  Employment  The data in Table 2, and other available information 
not presented in the table, reveals the following additional aspects 
of industrial country unemployment since 1973. 
 
a. The rise in unemployment in industrial countries in the post-Golden 
Age period has, in large part, been associated with an increase 
in the supply of labour. 
 
b. The increased supply of labour is almost entirely due to a rise 
in the participation rates of women, rather than due to a faster 
population growth or immigration. 
 
Thus it would seem that after 1973, women have been gaining jobs 
while men have been losing them. However, as Howes and Singh(1994) 
have argued, that given a persistent gender division of labour, mass 
unemployment in industrial countries should be attributed partly 
to separate forces operating on men and women: on the one hand, the 
rate of growth of men's jobs have fallen, while men have not withdrawn 
from the labour force at a comparable rate; women, on the other hand, 
have been entering the labour force at very high rates, but demand 
for female labour, though rising, has failed to keep up. Thus in 
the Howes and Singh analysis, high aggregate rates of unemployment 
arise both from high rates of labour force participation by women, 
and, importantly, also from 'deindustrialisation'. The two authors 
suggest that the differences in unemployment rates between countries 
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and between men and women are largely due to differences in the rates 
of these two processes. 
 
3. Output and Productivity  The aggregate data in Table 2 show that 
although GDP growth in Japan, US and OECD Europe fell after 1973, 
the rate of growth of productivity fell even further. Consequently, 
the net rate of aggregate employment creation in these countries(see 
column 3 of table 2) is little different in the post-1973 period, 
from that during the Golden Age.  
However, this aggregate result hides the important fact that in most 
industrial countries, the rate of job creation in both manufacturing 
and services has decreased after 1973, compared with the Golden Age.
7
 
 
The above data on productivity growth also bears on the extremely 
important question of how far the high unemployment in the post-Golden 
Age period can be attributed to an acceleration in the rate of 
technical progress. Freeman(1989) has argued that the current 
revolution in information and communications technology is similar 
in its pervasive all around effects on the economy to the previous 
three major technological revolutions of the last two centuries. 
However so far this technical change is not reflected in the increase 
                     
    
7
 Howes and Singh note that during the Golden Age, the faster 
growth of manufacturing and service jobs was able to absorb the large 
reductions in agricultural employment which occurred. There is a 
reduced decline in agricultural employment in the post-1973 period, 
which may, in itself be in part due to the slower growth of available 
manufacturing and service jobs. 
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in productivity growth as one would expect. Disaggregated data for 
individual countries and regions also indicates an almost universal 
trend fall in productivity growth in the period 1973-87 compared 
with 1960-73(Singh, forthcoming; see also below). All this suggests 
that either the pace of technical progress is no faster than before, 
or that the full benefits of these technological achievements have 
not been realised. In either case, acceleration of technogical 
progress cannot be blamed for the increase in unemployment. 
 
4.  Inflation  The data on inflation presented in Table 3 shows that 
the rate of inflation greatly increased in all leading industrial 
countries in the decade following the Golden Age. However, since 
then inflation has come down and during the last ten years the average 
rate of price increases has been much the same as during the Golden 
Age. 
 
To sum up, the post-Golden Age economy in industrial countries  has 
fared much worse than the Golden Age in terms of output expansion, 
productivity growth and employment. However, if we take a longer 
historical perspective (over a century or more), the economic record 
of the last two decades appears in a very  favourable light.(Matthews 
and Bowen, 1988). In such a long term quantitative perspective, it 
is the Golden Age which stands out as a historical aberration. 
 
III.  What Made Full Employment Possible? the Institutional 
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Framework of the Golden Age 
 
Kaldor(1976) observed: "The first twenty-five years after the end 
of the Second World War were an exceptional period of economic growth 
and prosperity in the leading industrial countries . . . I think 
I can safely say that almost no-one expected this to happen, since 
it was in such marked contrast to the course of events after World 
War one. This time there was no post-war slump." (emphasis in 
original, page 516). 
 
However, although there are many studies of why the Golden Age came 
to an end, economists have paid much less attention as to why the 
Golden Age happened in the first place. Yet, as Matthews and Bowen 
point out in their study of post-war macroeconomic trends, this 
phenomenon "needs explanation at least as much as the far more studied 
deterioration after 1973. Like most recent authors, we shall have 
little to say about it, beyond pointing out its importance". In 
quantitative terms the significance of the Golden Age cannot be 
exaggerated. Measured with respect to the rates of growth of output, 
productivity, capital stock, the period 1950-73 in advanced economies 
as a whole unquestionably represents a highly distinct deviation 
from the long-term trend values of these variables over the last 
two centuries. (Maddison, 1982). 
 
We present here in a summary form the comprehensive analysis of the 
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Golden Age by Glyn,Hughes, Lipietz and Singh(1990). For reasons of 
space, what follows is necessarily a highly schematic and condensed 
account of the investigation of a rather large question: why did 
the Golden Age arise and why did it come to an end? First, Glyn et 
al show on the basis of a detailed examination of the data that the 
length, steadiness, speed and spread of the Golden Age economic boom 
was such that the these could not be accounted for by an accidental 
combination of favourable economic circumstances. Secondly, they 
contend that the extraordinary economic performance of industrial 
countries was brought about and sustained by a specific economic 
regime. This regime, which differed in very important respects from 
the inter-war pattern of development, made full employment of labour 
force and full utilisation of resources, a primary objective inter 
alia for the governments to pursue.  
 
How this regime came to be instituted out of the ruins of the Great 
Depression and the Second World War is a complex question. At the 
international level, however, the answer is fairly straight forward. 
Careful plans were made by the United Kingdom and the United States 
governments during the course of the war. Specifically, Article 7 
of the Mutual Aid Agreement, signed in February 1942, committed the 
governments of the US and the UK to international co-operation after 
the war, and to embody in that co-operation two obligations, (i) 
the freedom of trade and (ii) the pursuit of full employment. 
Scammel(1983).  
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This planned, new, post-war international economic order accorded 
with the national security conceptions of the US State department 
and particularly of Secretary Cordell Hull. A pre-war State 
department memorandum outlines these concepts as follows: "A great 
expansion in the volume of international trade after the war will 
be essential to the attainment of full and effective employment in 
the United States and elsewhere, to the preservation of private 
enterprise, and the success of an international security system to 
prevent future wars". Gardener(1969). Secretary Hull and his 
colleagues felt that the protectionism of the inter-war period was 
responsible both for mass unemployment and the deterioration in the 
international security situation, ie. that protectionism led both 
to unemployment and to war, and that the best guarantee against either 
was the institution of a liberal international capitalist regime. 
 
It is highly significant that full employment is a recurring theme 
in most official documents of the new post-war international economic 
order. Thus, for example, the contracting parties to GATT in the 
very first clause of the Preamble declared themselves as: 
"Recognising that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily  growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full uses 
of the resources of the world . . ." (emphasis added).  Thus, under 
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GATT, free trade was not regarded as an end in itself.  The paramount 
importance of other objectives such as full employment and steady 
growth of real incomes and effective demand were explictly 
recognized.  
 
Turning to the national rules of co-ordination, the establishment 
of the Golden Age economic regime had a great deal to do with the 
post-war historical conjucture which was characterised by contention 
between the liberal, free market world economic order led by the 
United States and the alternative, represented by the then triumphant 
Soviet Union. It will be recalled that at the end of the second world 
war, the Soviet model had important attractions for people in Western 
Europe. The country had just played a critical role in defeating 
fascism; the crimes of the Stalin era had not yet been revealed. 
Equally importantly, compared with the mass unemployment in the 
inter-war period in the industrial countries, Soviet planning was 
regarded as having achieved full employment of resources. (see 
further Glyn et al, 1990). Although the West European trade union 
movement was weakened by its split into communist and christian 
blocks, nevertheless, in the context of this contention between the 
two systems, it was able to achieve far reaching institutional changes 
which, as will be explained below, were critical to the success of 
the Golden Age regime. 
 
At a purely descriptive macro-economic level, Glyn et al show that 
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the Golden Age was characterised by two extremely important 
relations: (a) rapid and parallel growth of productivity and capital 
stock per worker; and (b)  parallel growth of real wages and 
productivity. The significance of these two relations is that they 
guarantee both a roughly constant profit rate and roughly equal growth 
of consumption and production, thus ratifying and maintaining the 
initial rate of accumulation.   
 
However, such a macro-economic growth path could only be perpetuated 
if it were compatible with the behaviour of individual economic agents 
- firms, workers, consumers. This compatibility in the Golden Age 
was insured by a social consensus around institutional arrangements 
in respect of setting of wages and prices, the distribution between 
wages and profits, and the state fiscal, credit and welfare policies 
which guaranteed minimum living standards and maintained aggregate 
demand.  In the sphere of wage setting, for example, productivity 
wage bargaining which flourished during this period played a key 
role both in keeping a rough constancy of the share of wages and 
profits in the national product and also in helping to provide an 
adequate rate of growth in consumer demand.  Similarly, at the 
international level, under the leadership of a singe hegemonic power 
for much of this period, the US, the global economic system functioned 
under stable monetary and trading arrangements.   
 
It is sometimes contended that because the US economy itself did 
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not perform as well as other industrial countries in the Golden Age, 
this suggests that all that happened during this period was a process 
of 'catch-up'. It is indeed true, that unlike the European countries 
and Japan, the rate of growth of GDP for the US during the Golden 
Age, was not higher that in any previous period. However, the US 
rate of growth of productivity (measured by GDP per man-hour) was 
faster than ever recorded before, although again for this variable, 
the European and the Japanese performance during the Golden Age was 
far superior. These facts are compatible with the 'catch-up' theory, 
but what is not compatible is the fact that almost as big a gap (and 
hence the scope for 'catch-up'), between US and European levels of 
productivity existed at the start of the First World War in 1913, 
as it did in 1939 (Matthews and Bowen, 1988; Cairncross and 
Cairncross, 1992). In other words, there was no 'catch-up' at all 
in the inter-war period. What made it possible in the post-World 
War II period was not merely the existence of a technological gap, 
but more crucially, the institutional system at the national and 
the international levels which allowed this technological potential 
to be harnessed. 
 
IV.  The Erosion of the Golden Age and the New Post-1980 Development 
Model 
 
Glyn et al suggest that the process of the erosion of the Golden 
Age began well before the oil price shock of 1973.  Serious 
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difficulties arose at the levels of both the national and the 
international regulatory regimes;  these began to interact with each 
other in a cumulatively adverse way to the detriment of the system 
as a whole.  The Bretton Woods monetary system broke down in the 
late 1960s, partly as a consequence of the success of the Golden 
Age itself - the rise of the Japanese, the West German and other 
European countries in the international market place led to serious 
balance of payments problems for  the US, hitherto the lynch pin 
of the international system.  There is also evidence of a slow-down 
in the growth of productivity by the late 1960s in several leading 
industrial countries, which was not matched by a deceleration in 
the rate of growth of real wages, thus leading to a profit squeeze. 
  
By the early 1970s, the Golden Age system was so fragile, that it 
disintegrated under the impact of the two oil shocks, thus pushing 
the world economy into a period of prolonged slow growth which began 
in 1973.  The social consensus of the Golden years which was crucial 
to the functioning of the economic system as a whole broke down.  
For a while, after the first oil shock, the governments of some OECD 
countries tried to restore the Golden Age institutional consensus, 
by following expansionary economic policies. But, since inflation 
could not be controlled, this attempt was finally abandoned in 1979.  
 
V.2  The Post-1980 Development Strategy 
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This abandonment was symbolized by the so-called 'Volcker shock' 
(named after the then Chairman of the U.S. Ferderal Reserve, Paul 
Volcker). This involved the implementation of deeply contractionary 
monetary policies in the United States, which were subsequently 
widely followed in other industrial countries, largely by a process 
of 'competitive deflation'. Singh (1986). These policies led to a 
more than ten-fold jump in real interest rates compared with the 
preceding period and gave rise to a prolonged recession in industrial 
countries.  
 
The effects on the Third World countries of these measures was 
devastating. They were disadvantaged through the following main 
channels: a) a reduced rate of growth of demand for the South's 
products in the North; b) as a consequence, a big fall in commodity 
prices and adverse terms of trade; c) a large rise in debt service 
payments; d) a sudden and a huge fall in normal capital flows to 
the South, particularly to the African and Latin American economies. 
[Dornbusch, 1985; Fishlow, 1992; Singh, 1992.]  The net result has 
been a long economic crisis and the 'lost decade' of the 1980s for 
large parts of the South.  
  
In the 1980s and into the 1990s, the leading OECD governments have 
been attempting to create a new economic system based much more on 
free market principles. In pursuit of this objective, there has been 
a widespread movement towards "privatisation", "de-regulation" and 
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the erosion of Golden Age arrangements with respect for example to 
wage bargaining and to the provisions of the welfare state (with 
the professed aim of increasing labour market flexibility).  
Moreover, in the adoption of rules about monetary growth and public 
sector deficits in most countries, there has been an implicit 
abandonment of the full employment policies of the Golden Age. The 
countries of the South have also had to implement similar arrangements 
in order to meet the conditionalities of the Bretton Woods 
institutions.   
 
The retreat from the Golden Age institutions and customs with respect 
to employment protection, labour standards, welfare state 
privileges, trade union activity, has inevitably occurred at 
different speeds in various European countries.  However the UK seems 
to have gone further than most in the direction of adopting this 
new post-Golden Age development model of market supremacy and labour 
market flexibility. UN (1994).  At the international level the new 
economic regime is characterised by ever greater integration of the 
world economy through trade, portfolio and foreign direct investment. 
  Close international financial integration has been a particularly 
significant feature of the post-1980 world economy.  Such 
integration has been brought about by the more or less complete 
abolition of exchange controls in leading industrial economies and 
the globalisation of the stock markets. (Cosh, Hughes and Singh, 
1992). 
  
 
 21 
 
The post-1980 development model has been successful in some ways 
- the most conspicuous being the sharp decline in the OECD rate of 
inflation. Instead of 'stagflation' of the 1970s - ie. low growth 
and high inflation - the 1980s and the 1990s so far, have been 
characterised by low growth and low inflation. However, this 
'victory' over inflation has come at an exceptionally high cost in 
terms of social justice and economic efficiency.  The extension of 
the role of free markets in the name of efficiency has, paradoxically, 
generated massive inefficiency characterized by a huge 
underutilization of resources worldwide, not least human resources. 
 It is therefore not surprising that the new free-market model does 
not yet command a broad social consensus in industrial countries.  
 
V.  The Analytics of the Fall of the Golden Age 
 
In their conceptualisation of the demise of the Golden Age, Glyn 
et al emphasise the role of the following factors. 
 
1.  The perpetuation of the Golden Age of full employment and low 
growth required the smooth and consistent operation of both the 
internal and external rules of coordination of the economic system 
.  As long as the system was working, it had strong positive feedback 
mechanisms.  However, it was an unstable equilibrium - relatively 
small exogenous shocks or changes in endogenous variables outside 
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their normal range could push the industrial country economies off 
the high employment growth path. 
 
2.  One factor which plays a key role in Glyn et al's analysis is 
that of productivity slow-down towards the end of the 1960s in 
industrial countries.
8
  There was no institutional mechanism for 
there to be a concomitant reduction in the rate of growth of real 
wages.  The result was a profit squeeze which was further exacerbated 
by international factors such as the rise in raw material prices 
in the early 1970s. 
 
3.  The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the international 
rules of coordination meant that the balance of payments 
disequilibria between nations, arising from the first oil shock, 
could not be resolved at a rate of growth of world demand in real 
terms which was compatible with full employment and low inflation. 
  Most economists at the time believed that introduction of floating 
exchange rates will make the system more flexible and remove an 
important restraint on economic growth.  In practice this turned 
out to be an illusion and the asymmetrical adjustment processes of 
                     
    
8
 Matthews and Bowen(1988) agree that the 'watershed' - the trend 
change in long-term economic growth - came before 1973. The two 
authors, as well as Solow(1992), also underline the significance of 
the productivity slow-down in the late 1960s. Section V of Glyn et 
al's essay provides a systematic comparison of their analysis of the 
various aspects of the Golden Age with that of Maddison(1982), 
Lindbeck(1983), Bruno and Sachs(1985) and others. 
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the international economic system soon reasserted themselves.  
Countries which followed Keynsian expansionary policies in the wake 
of the oil price increase became balance of payment constrained and 
were faced with the prospect of currency depreciations in 
inflationary conditions.  The simultaneous breakdown of the internal 
rules of coordination with respect to wages and prices made it more 
difficult to use exchange rate movements as an equilibriating device 
in the international sphere.   
 
4.  In the analysis presented by Glyn et al, the Golden Age    would 
have come to an end through its own internal logic even if there 
had been no exogenous shocks, such as the oil price increases.  The 
efficiency of the central institutions of the Golden Age economic 
regime became progressively eroded the longer the system was in 
operation.  Internally, the prolonged full employment increased the 
power of the workers and through their successful wage demands 
undermined  the social compromise with the employers.  Similarly, 
 the international coordination became much more difficult with the 
relative economic decline over time of the United States, the hedgemon 
in the system.  The continuation of the Golden Age would have required 
institutional renewal to address these difficulties of the economic 
regime.   
 
VI.  Conventional Economic Analysis and Mass Unemployment 
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In order to put into perspective the institutional analysis of the 
economic record of the Golden Age and its aftermath, it may be useful 
to see how successful are the conventional economic models in 
accounting for the long-run variations in employment, unemployment, 
inflation and productivity in industrial countries. The following 
points are relevant in this context. 
 
1.  Jacob Frankel and Harry Johnson in their then highly influential 
book, The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments, published 
in 1976, observed: 
"That the monetary approach (to the balance of payments) largely 
assumes a fully employed economy is partly the result of the 
fact that in the context of a growing world economy in the long 
run, the assumption of wage rigidity and variable employment 
becomes uninteresting; either employment expands into the full 
employment range and quantity adjustments yield to money price 
and wage adjustments, or it contracts and people starve to death 
and go back to full employment numbers, or there is a revolution 
on Marxist lines, or more likely the public simply votes for 
the other political party than the one in power, since all of 
them maintain full employment and the public expects them to 
do it ...... More fundamentally, the assumption of normally 
full employment reflects the passage of time and the 
accumulation of experience of reasonably full employment as 
the historical norm rather than the historical rarity that 
Keynes's theory and the left-wing Keynesian methodology made 
it out to be." 
 
In other words, these distinguished economists of the Chicago school 
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were taking the Golden Age of full employment as the norm for a 
capitalist economy, and were asserting that there is sufficient 
wage-price flexibility for the labour markets to yield full 
employment.  Later these types of analysis were  formalised in the 
'new classical' models which postulate full employment in the way 
attributed to the proverbial caricature of economic modelling: "let 
us assume that there is a can opener".  Despite the obvious lack 
of perfect competition in the labor market, the simple formal argument 
is of course that the labor market is fully competitive, and behaves 
like any other such market.  The market clearing process leads to 
full employment, and any unemployment must therefore be voluntary. 
 The main conclusion of the more complete analysis from this paradigm 
is that unemployment is always at its natural rate bar any 
unanticipated shocks to the economy - i.e. there is no trade-off 
at all between unemployment and inflation either in the short or 
the long runs.   
 
2.  The left Keynsian-Marxist position on the subject was put forward 
fifty years ago in a brilliant essay by the Polish economist, Michael 
Kalecki.  Kalecki (1943) wrote: "'Full employment capitalism' will 
have, of course to develop new social and political institutions 
which will reflect the increased power of the working class.  If 
capitalism can adjust itself to full employment a fundamental reform 
will have been incorporated in it.  If not, it will show itself an 
outmoded system which must be scrapped. .....But perhaps the fight 
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for full employment may lead to fascism?  Perhaps capitalism will 
adjust itself to full employment in this way?  This seems extremely 
unlikely.  Fascism sprang up in Germany against a background of 
tremendous unemployment and maintained itself in power through 
securing full employment while capitalist democracy failed to do 
so.  The fight of the progressive forces for full employment is at 
the same time a way of preventing the recurrence of fascism." 
    
Kalecki was sceptical about the possibilities of permanent full 
employment in capitalist economies with their extant institutions. 
 The main reason for his scepticism was his view that unemployment, 
or the reserve army of labour, had an essential disciplinary role 
under capitalism.  Unless different institutional mechanisms were 
available 
to perform this task, capitalists will oppose the achievement of 
prolonged full employment by Keynsian means. 
 
3.  It is necessary to emphasise that none of the leading economic 
models - the traditional Keynsian, new classical, neo-Keynsian 
(NAIRU) - can on their own satisfactorily explain the stylised facts 
about inter-temporal and inter-country variations of unemployment 
during this century.  With respect to the former, recall from section 
II, that the main empirical phenomena that require explanation are 
the following combinations of unemployment and inflation: (a) Mass 
unemployment with low inflation during the inter-war period; (b) 
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full employment and moderate inflation during the Golden Age; (c) 
stagflation of the 1970s and (d) mass unemployment and moderate 
inflation during the last decade.  In relation to inter-country 
variations, the chief contemporary issue is why unemployment is so 
much higher in EEC countries than either in the US or the non EEC 
nations.   
 
4.  This subject cannot be discussed in any detail here but it may 
be observed that the models which look for explanation of these 
phenomena in the labour market are unable to account for much of 
the inter-temporal variation.  For example Matthews and Bowen (1988) 
point out that real product wages rose more and there was less labour 
market flexibility in the Golden Age than in the inter-war period. 
 Yet the earlier period experienced the Great Depression and the 
later had full employment.  Similarly, the traditional 
Keynsian-Phillips curve models broke down in the stagflation of the 
1970s.   
 
5.  Some argue [see for example Krugman, 1994] that the leading 
mainstream models today are all based on the concept of NAIRU.
9
  
However, such models have great difficulty in accounting for the 
facts of the Golden Age. For twenty long years, in the 1950s and 
60s there was full employment, or even overfull employment in 
                     
    
9
 See Layard et al (1991), for an authoritative exposition of 
the NAIRU analyses. 
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countries like the UK and West Germany, and the inflation remained 
moderate - it did not accelerate into hyper-inflation.  [See 
contributions on this point by Vines, Solow and Worswick in Cairncross 
and Cairncross (1992).]  Moreover, Solow (1994) notes that the NAIRU 
model cannot satisfactorily explain the step increase in European 
unemployment in the 1980s (the European economies, as noted above, 
were moving towards labour market flexibility and market supremacy 
during this period, which under the NAIRU paradigm should have lowered 
rather than increased unemployment).  At best, NAIRU models assume 
given positions on key (unspecified) variables in the short run, 
but do not explain why the positions may change drastically between 
periods and so drastically alter the relationship between 
unemployment and inflation.     
 
6.  However, NAIRU models claim to be able to account for the present 
differences in the US and EU unemployment rates.  It is suggested 
that the superior employment performance of the US economy relative 
to the Europeans is due to its greater labour market flexibility 
and lower growth of real wages.  Europeans, on the other hand, have 
a more extensive welfare state, less flexible labour markets and 
therefore higher NAIRU.  The result is higher European unemployment, 
but also higher growth rates for real wages compared with the United 
States.    
 
It is interesting in this context to recall the late Lord Kaldor's 
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Cambridge Keynesian explanation for the same phenomena. In the spirit 
of the Keynesian causal mechanism, in which employment is determined 
not in the labour market but by aggregate demand and output, Kaldor 
argued that the lower US unemployment was due to the greater growth 
of demand and output in the US economy, arising from the more expansive 
stance of fiscal policy in the US.  Similarly in keeping with the 
Keynsian theory that only wages (and not employment) are determined 
in the labour market, Kaldor ascribed the US-Europe differences in 
growth of real wages to the differences in productivity growth on 
the two sides of the Atlantic.   
 
7.  Not only are the conventional models not very satisfactory in 
accounting for the patterns of unemployment and inflation in 
industrial countries, they are also not very helpful with respect 
to the important question of explaining changes in productivity 
growth.  Consider for example the trend fall in productivity growth 
in the world economy in the post Golden Age period compared with 
the Golden Age. Table 4 provides figures for the growth of GDP, capital 
and labour inputs and total factor productivity (TFP), separately 
for each of the sub-periods, 1960-73 and 1973-87, for the four leading 
industrial economies, for each of the five developing regions as 
well as for a group of 68 developing economies. These data show that 
in every region, and for each country or group of countries shown 
in the table except South Asia (ie. in nine out of ten observations), 
the rate of growth of TFP fell substantially during 1973-87, compared 
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with 1960-73.  
 
None of the conventional models referred to above make any attempt 
to explain these variations in productivity growth, despite the 
critical role this variable plays in these models.  As Matthews and 
Bowen observe, the silence on this subject of the new classical models 
which stress the supply side is particularly striking. Let us 
consider, nevertheless, how such models will explain a decline in 
productivity growth. In terms of the new classical paradigm, a fall 
in productivity growth can arise from a variety of supply side 
factors: supply side shocks, price distortions, or in dynamic form, 
a lower rate of technical progress due to increased market 
imperfections and distortions in the incentive system, lack of 
integration with the world economy etc.  The evidence, however, is 
not compatible with such an analysis, since as noted earlier, under 
the new post-Golden Age development strategy, there has actually 
been more competition, greater integration of the world economy, 
less distortions in the labour and other markets in the latter period 
(particularly in the 1980s) than in the former.  Moreover the supply 
side shocks which occurred in the 1970s (rise in oil and commodity 
prices) had more than reversed themselves in the 1980s. 
 
These facts are much more in accord with the Kaldorian perspective 
(Verdoorn's Law) which would suggest that the fall in the world and 
the national economic growth rates in the post-1973 period was 
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responsible for the decline in the rate of growth of productivity 
in most regions. Verdoorn's Law
10
 predicts that the faster (slower) 
the growth of production, the faster (slower) the growth of 
productivity. Simple regression analysis confirms the positive 
relationship between the two variables in Table 4.
11
 The decline in 
world economic growth after 1973, in terms of this analysis, is 
attributed to a lower rate of growth of world and national demand 
caused by the whole range of factors  connected with the fall of 
the Golden Age of development of the OECD economies. 
 
VII.  Policy Implications 
 
This section comments on the policy implications of the institutional 
and historical analysis of the rise and fall of the Golden Age for 
the 1990s and the new millennium. However, before doing this it will 
be useful to examine some aspects of the post-1980 development 
strategy which is currently being implemented in industrial countries 
(as well as in many developing countries). 
                     
    
10
 The classic references here are Verdoorn (1949) and Kaldor 
(1966). For a review, see McCombie (1987).  
    
11
 The analysis produced the following fitted regression equation. 
 
 p = -.17 + .59q 
    (-.54)   (3.8) 
 R2 =  .60 
 
Where p is the change in the growth rate of productivity and q is 
the change in the growth rate of output between the two periods. 
Parentheses give t values of the coefficients. 
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As seen earlier, although under the new regime, inflation has become 
moderate, unemployment remains extremely high.  It could however 
be argued that this regime is still in its transitional stage and 
not yet fully established.  That raises the question, will the free 
market regime be more successful once it is completely operational?  
 
The problem here is, how is the "success" to be measured?  It may 
be suggested that, from the point of view of the conservative ruling 
circles in industrial countries, the strategy is already highly 
successful.  It has changed the balance of power both internally 
within these countries as well as with respect to developing 
countries.  It will be recalled that not too long ago, developing 
countries were vociferously demanding a new international economic 
order.  Today, not many people are.  In the 1980s, as a consequence 
of the changes in economic policy in industrial countries under the 
new strategy (the Volcker shock) and the resultant debt crisis, many 
Latin American and African nations were reduced to being supplicants 
before the international financial institutions.  Similarly, in 
industrial countries themselves, the balance of power has shifted 
decisively in favour of capital. Union power has greatly diminished 
and profit rates, which had plummeted in the 1970s, are now back 
to their highest levels in the post-war period.  In these 
circumstances, unless mass unemployment becomes electorally 
expensive, these is no reason for these governments to change their 
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economic policies. 
 
It is important to appreciate that just as it has not done so in 
the last decade, the pursuit of labour market flexibility on its 
own is unlikely to lead to an appreciable rise in employment in the 
current circumstances of the European economies. In principle, the 
governments could abolish all trade union rights as well as the entire 
social security system. If that were done,the social and employment 
situation in industrial economies would become similar to that found 
in developing countries. The recorded rates of unemployment in the 
latter group tend to be relatively low. This is because in the virtual 
absence of a publicly provided social security system, people are 
obliged to engage in any economic activity, howsoever 
non-remunerative and non-productive that may be. The problem of 
'unemployment' in poor countries, therefore, manifests itself 
generally in the form of what Joan Robinson called 'disguised 
unemployment', or as 'underemployment'.   
 
In practice, it is very unlikely that any government in an industrial 
country will be able to flout the minimum norms of modern democratic 
societies with respect to trade union rights or social security 
entitlements. This therefore means that to achieve a sizeable 
reduction in the current mass unemployment, and certainly to attain 
full employment, it is essential to institute a substantial trend 
increase in the rates of growth of aggregate demand (in real terms) 
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and output in industrial countries
12
. However, the demand constraint 
on OECD production is not technical: the constraint is deeply 
institutional. It cannot be removed simply by the leading industrial 
country governments changing their fiscal and monetary policies. 
If they did so, without an appropriate restraining institutional 
framework at the national and international levels, the result,on 
past evidence, would in large measure be a rise in commodity prices, 
an increase in trade union militancy and higher inflation, which 
in turn would thwart the expansionary process.  
 
What policy lessons do we learn from the Golden Age episode with 
respect to these institutional requirements in order to obtain 
sustainable full employment with low inflation?  These may be 
summarised as follows: 
 
1.An extremely important lesson from the Golden Age is that, in the 
present interdependent global economy, it is necessary to have 
efficient and consistent rules of coordinating mechanisms in 
both the internal and the external spheres.  As we saw in the 
                     
    
12
 Economists disagree as to whether the current high rates of 
unemployment are due to deficiency of demand in the Keynesian sense, 
i.e., that there is adequate capital stock but that the degree of 
capacity utilisation is low. The other view is that because of 
prolonged under utilisation, much of the capital stock has become 
obsolete and therefore must be replaced. As far as the argument in 
the text is concerned, whichever policy measures are taken (whether 
to increase the stock of capital, or to raise capacity utilisation), 
it would inter alia, lead to a rise in the overall demand pressure 
in the economy.       
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analysis of the demise of the Golden Age, by the late 1960s, 
both these mechanisms had eroded and were interacting with each 
other to generate evermore severe adverse consequences for the 
economy.  Indeed, James Meade (1993), in his Nobel lecture, 
regarded internal balance, in the current circumstances of 
industrial countries, as a necessary condition for achieving 
an external balance. 
 
2.As far as the internal balance is concerned, there are two points 
at issue here.  Firstly, what is required is 
institutionalisation of an incomes policy to restrict money 
wage demands in line with the country's changing macroeconomic 
potential, so as to avoid leap-frogging inflation.  It is also 
clear that, in order for such a policy to work, it must be seen 
to be fair, involve over time progressive redistributions of 
income, and not simply be a device for reducing workers' living 
standards or freezing the distribution of income. 
 
It will be argued that incomes policies have not worked in the past. 
 Why should they therefore be expected to work today?  One 
important reason is that we now have experience of the 
alternative economic regime as well, with its unpleasant 
results.  Instead of the continued waste involved in keeping 
an ever larger reserve army of the unemployed (with increasing 
NAIRU as unemployment grows), surely it is sensible to seek 
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cooperative arrangements between employees and employers, 
which can at least reduce this waste. 
 
3.Secondly, a central question in this context is whether the best 
way to institute such arrangements is through corporatist, 
normally centralised wage bargaining, with the government 
playing a key enabling role, or through decentralised systems, 
 Until recently, it was accepted that the corporatist systems 
had performed better in terms of both employment and wage 
equality than decentralised systems. [Pekkarinen et al, 1992]. 
 However, this conclusion has been put into doubt by the 
apparent recent failure of the Swedish model.  But it is far 
from clear that the large rise in Swedish unemployment in the 
last two years is due to the weaknesses of corporatism, rather 
than to other causes.  Rowthorn (1994) suggests that, although 
the system suffered from many faults, the huge increase in 
unemployment is due far more to the previous Swedish 
government's macroeconomic policy mistakes. 
 
4.Nevertheless, the Swedish case does raise the important question 
of creating an institutional framework which keeps labour 
discipline and does not blunt incentives, even when the economy 
has sustained full employment.  This of course was an issue 
which faced the central planners in the former socialist 
countries in an acute form.  The problem, in principle, and 
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in practice, is not insoluble, as the experience of large 
Japanese firms with lifetime employment of their workers and 
a remuneration package based in large measure on seniority, 
suggests. This permanent full employment of Japanese workers, 
as well as the existence of relatively narrow pay differentials 
within a typical large Japanese corporation,  clearly has not 
reduced its efficiency, as is evidenced by the excellent 
competitive performance of the Japanese firms in the 
international economy. Indeed, many scholars of the Japanese 
economy would suggest that these rigidities of that country's 
labour market are positively functional. It leads workers to 
be willing to invest in firm-specific human capital, to welcome 
rather than resist technical change, and to identify their own 
interests with those of the corporations they work for.
13
 It 
is also worth observing that lifetime employment was not a 
peculiar cultural trait of the inscrutable Japanese, but very 
much an institutional innovation of the postwar Japanese 
economy. 
 
5.Turning to the international sphere, there are some important 
lessons which emerge from the analysis of the rise and fall 
of the Golden Age with respect to international economic 
coordination: 
                     
    
13
For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Dore (1986). 
 See also Chang (1993) and Singh (1993). 
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(a) A critical lesson of the Golden Age is that the US, as the hegemonic 
power, played the key role in the international coordination 
process during this period.  It often supplanted the 
international financial institutions altogether.  For 
example, the postwar rehabilitation of Europe and Japan was 
done by the US on its own (the Marshall Plan in Europe and the 
Dod Plan in Japan) rather than being entrusted to the IMF or 
the World Bank. During the Golden Age period, whether through 
altruism or through national security interest, the US acted 
on a farsighted design, based on non-reciprocity.
14
 
 
With the relative decline of US economic power over time, and more 
recently by the ending of the cold war, the situation has 
radically changed.  What is required now is for the 
international coordinating mechanism and the Bretton Wood 
Institutions to become genuinely multilateral.  The IMF and 
the World Bank have evolved over time into simply being agents 
of the G3 or G7 to discipline the third world.  However, in 
                     
    
14
 As Spiro (1977) notes: "In the short term it (the US) dealt 
with its own huge balance-of-trade-surplus and the European and 
Japanese deficits by foreign aid and military expenditures.  In 
addition the United States abandoned the Bretton-Woods goal of 
convertibility and encouraged European and Japanese trade 
protectionism and discrimination against the dollar.  For example, 
the United States absorbed large volumes of Japanese exports while 
accepting Japanese restrictions against American exports... To 
encourage long term adjustment, the United States promoted European 
and Japanese trade competitiveness." (emphasis added).    
14
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the new world circumstances, multilateral institutions are 
needed to discipline the great powers as well when they follow 
economic policies harmful to the rest of the world (e.g the 
Volcker shock which precipitated the debt crisis and hence the 
"lost decade" in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa). 
 
b) There is a  need for symmetric adjustment in circumstances where 
it is required to raise the rate of growth of the world economy. 
Under the present system, if an important county such as 
Germany, chooses to put fighting inflation as a more important 
objective than reducing unemployment, other countries are 
obliged to follow suit in order to avoid balance of payments 
problems or runs on their currency. Not only the objectives 
of leading countries differ, equally importantly, they may have 
varying analyses of how the economic system functions. For full 
employment to be achieved in these circumstances would require 
adjustments by both deficit and surplus countries.  
  
(c) Symmetrical adjustment is also required between strong and weak 
industrial countries. Strong industrial countries like Japan 
have developed a production structure which enables them to 
be perpetually in surplus at their desired levels of inflation 
and employment while competitively weak countries (e.g. like 
UK or US) are unable to achieve their economic objectives 
without running into a balance of payments constraint (or 
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alternatively an ultimate debt constraint in a world of free 
capital movements).  
 
(d) There are those who argue that all that is required at the 
international level is not  close policy coordination, but 
rather a rule-based system with perhaps wider bands for 
permissible exchange rate movements. Williamson (1992) is an 
ardent exponent of this perspective. However, as a number of 
practitioners have pointed out, although such a system may have 
been workable during the golden age when there were capital 
controls, yet it would be overwhelmed in a world of free capital 
movements, where national economic objectives greatly differ. 
For the rule-based system to work in these conditions, it is 
essential to have the utmost commonality of objectives and close 
cooperation between central banks.  
 
(e)Tobin (1992) has put forward a less ambitious proposal in this 
respect which may be more practical. He suggests that each 
country should frame its own targets for macro-economic policy. 
These will not then be imposed on it but what would be imposed 
would be policies consistent with their own targets. Tobin 
argues that this would lead logically to some determination 
of what movements and differences in interest rates should be 
permitted in different countries.  However, whether such a 
scheme will yield an adequate rate of growth of world demand 
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and output to  permit full employment for all those countries 
which wish to have it, is far from being clear. 
 
It may well be the case that if the nation states, particularly the 
big economic powers, continue to differ in their objectives, 
it may be necessary to revert to the golden age system of capital 
controls[ whether through a Tobin tax or more directly] to 
enable full employment to be possible in countries for whom 
this is a primary goal.  Capital controls do impose a social 
cost in terms of reduced efficiency, but this has to be compared 
with the social and economic costs of unemployment. 
 
(f)Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even in a world of 
conflicting national objectives and free capital movements, 
the task of international coordination will be much easier if 
the institutional mechanisms for securing internal balance were 
working adequately. This will enable countries to use the 
exchange rate much more freely to attain the external balance. 
As is evident, however, there is a close interaction between 
the internal and external instruments of coordination. The 
internal mechanisms ( for example, an incomes policy ) will 
work more effectively, the less the burden they have to carry 
of external coordination as well,  i.e., the smaller for 
example the fluctuations in the world economy and therefore 
the smaller the required changes in the exchange rate. 
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(g)The concept of  interaction between the internal and external 
instruments of coordination is all the more relevant with 
respect to the important question of fluctuations in 
international commodity prices. Kaldor argued that an important 
factor  in sustaining the golden age economic boom was the 
general stability of commodity prices in the 1950s and 1960s 
( except for a very brief period during the Korean war). The 
mild fluctuations of commodity prices in real terms around a 
gently declining trend played a significant role in maintaining 
relative price stability in the golden age . Kaldor ascribed 
this time path of commodity prices to the following favourable 
circumstances: (i) a trend rise in commodity production as a 
consequence of technical progress and importantly the price 
support programmes in the US and other industrial countries; 
(ii) the US commodity stockpiles whose very existence damped 
speculative expectations of commodity price increases. 
 
In the Kaldorian analysis, the commodity price boom of early 1970s 
(which raised commodity prices significantly in real terms) 
played an important role in triggering the stagflation observed 
during that decade. In an important contribution,  Kaldor( 
1976) showed that commodity price stabilisation was not just 
in the interest of poor countries, but that it benefitted the 
rich countries even more. This is essentially because when 
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commodity prices fall in real terms, it reduces the developing 
country demand for industrial country products and is therefore 
recessionary. However, when there is a real rise in commodity 
prices, the consequences are not symmetrical. The adverse terms 
of trade in industrial countries generate a  wage-price spiral, 
which in turn obliges the governments to attempt to reduce 
monetary and real demand pressures in the economy to contain 
inflation. 
 
In the light of this analysis, following Keynes, Kaldor together 
with Tinbergen and Hart proposed an international buffer stock 
scheme to contain commodity price fluctuations and at the same 
time to help maintain a high rate of growth of real world 
demand.
15
 The scheme was not acted upon. 
 
However such a scheme is all the more important today because of 
the greater fluctuations in commodity prices in the 1980s and 
1990s. Despite the clear advantages of commodity price 
stabilisation for both the North and the South, stabilisation 
schemes have been resisted by the US and other industrial 
countries, often on ideological grounds.
16
 
 
                     
    
15
See further Kaldor, (1993). 
    
16
 On these issues, see further Maizels,(1988); Singh and 
Tabatabai,(1993). 
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In the absence of this cooperation at the international level, as 
suggested above, even greater burden is put on the other 
institutional instruments for maintaining internal and 
external balance. 
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
This essay has argued that the post-1980 economic regime of industrial 
countries based on labour market flexibility and market supremacy 
cannot by itself provide full employment. Restoration of full 
employment with moderate inflation requires the abandonment of this 
market confrontational model and its replacement by more cooperative 
institutional arrangements involving workers, employers and 
governments in industrial countries, as well as more cooperative 
relationships between nation states.  At the international level, 
such a task is much more difficult today than it was during the Golden 
Age when a single hegemonic country, the US, was able to ensure global 
cooperation on what happened to be a generally benign design. In 
present circumstances, matters are greatly complicated by 
differences between countries, both in their economic objectives 
and their views about how the economic system works. The necessary 
work of institution building and institutional innovation and 
renewal, at both the national and international levels, for achieving 
permanent full employment in market economies is therefore certainly 
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challenging, but not impossible. An essential first step in this 
endeavor is a fundamental change in intellectual direction and in 
the analytical approach to the problem.  This paper will have served 
its purpose if it succeeds in making a small contribution towards 
that end.   
 
 
 
